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Abstract 
 
A JRC workshop on split incentives organised in the framework of article 19(1)(a) of the Energy Efficiency Directive 
(Directive) has been organised in order to examine current solutions addressing split incentives in the building sector in 
Europe and beyond. The workshop focused on the social housing, private residential and commercial sectors. Practices 
from Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, Denmark, Sweden and the US were presented and a panel discussion between 
representatives from groups of landlords, tenants, social housing and ESCOs was held.  
 
This report provides a summary of the presented material. 
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 4 
 
  
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
Terminology ............................................................................................................................................ 7 
Main highlights........................................................................................................................................ 9 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 11 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... 11 
Practices in the social housing sector ................................................................................................... 13 
Netherlands ..................................................................................................................................... 13 
Italy ................................................................................................................................................... 15 
United States .................................................................................................................................... 16 
United Kingdom ............................................................................................................................... 19 
Denmark ........................................................................................................................................... 20 
Sweden ............................................................................................................................................. 23 
Alternative approaches for incentivising tenants and owners in residential & commercial sectors ... 26 
German Housing Rent Index ........................................................................................................... 26 
U.S. Green Leases ............................................................................................................................. 29 
Green Lease implications in 11 European Countries ................................................................... 30 
 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
Terminology 
 
'Cold rent' refers to the base rent. 
 
'Green lease' is a lease between a landlord and tenant of a commercial building which 
provides obligations on both parties to minimise adverse environmental impact in areas 
such as energy, water and waste. 
 
'Gross lease' is a lease whereby all operating expenses are borne by the landlord. Any 
capital expense that reduces operating expenses is solely in the landlord’s domain. 
 
'Inclusive rent' see 'gross lease' 
 
'Modified gross lease' is a lease in which the tenant pays base rent at the lease's 
inception but in subsequent years pays the base rent plus a proportional share of some 
of the other costs associated with the property. In building-related energy terms, 
tenants may be required to pay their proportional share of the heating expenses under a 
modified gross lease.  
 
'Net lease' is a lease in which the tenant is responsible for some of the additional costs 
associated with the property. There are three types of net leases: single net, double net 
and triple net. Under a single net lease, the tenant pays rent plus property taxes. Under a 
double net lease, the tenant pays rent plus property taxes and insurance. Under a triple 
net lease, the tenant pays for rent plus property taxes, insurance and maintenance. 
 
'Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE)' is a means of financing energy efficiency 
upgrades in a building where the upgrade is financed by bonds issued by municipalities 
and paid back by an additional charge on the property tax bill. 
 
'Reverse split incentive' refers to situations where tenants are not responsible for 
paying their utility bills and thereby have little or no incentive to conserve energy.  
 
'Split or misaligned incentive' refers to transactions where the benefits do not accrue 
to the person who pays for the transaction. In the context of building-related energy, it 
refers to the situation where the building owner pays for energy retrofits efficiency 
upgrades but cannot recover savings from reduced energy use that accrue to the tenant. 
 
'Temporal split incentive' refers to situations where the energy efficiency investment 
does not pay off before the agent transfers the property. 
 
'Transaction costs' in the energy efficiency investments are costs related to gathering 
and assessing information of equipment or material, making agreements in order to 
carry out and enforce the contract, monitoring and verifying the actual level of energy 
efficiency improvement, etc.  
 
'Warm rent' refers to the base rent plus utility costs for heating and sometimes hot 
water.  
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Main highlights  
 
Several current practices tackling split incentive issues between landlords and tenants 
across Europe and beyond have been discussed as part of this workshop. While it is 
clear that a one-size-fits-all solution does not exist due to particularities across various 
segments of the building sector and different national conditions, a number of findings 
can be highlighted. 
  
 A successful approach to overcoming misaligned incentives between tenants and 
owners should consider splitting costs and benefits in a balanced way. A share of 
energy cost savings should be allowed to be used for investment repayments. While 
this means that tenants could be subject to a repayment fee in their utility bills, 
landlords should also take part of the investment cost in view of the property's value 
increase as a result of the energy efficiency upgrade.  
 
 In the Netherlands, in addition to the incorporation of energy performance in the 
social rent evaluation, a total housing cost guarantee ensures that social tenants are 
protected against increase in their total housing costs, comprising the base rent and 
utility costs, in case of an energy renovation. The Dutch social housing corporations 
act as a revolving fund and have access to government-guaranteed, long term, low-
interest loans.  
 
 A successful on-bill finance programme should create incentives for all stakeholders: 
tenants (savings), landlords (savings/investment), utilities (protection/decoupling) 
and by extension banks. As high transaction costs linked to the realisation of these 
investments deter landlords from upgrading their rented property, a small incentive 
to landlords should be considered in on-bill finance programmes specifically 
designed to target rented properties in the private and/or social housing sectors. 
 
 Forbidding landlords to let properties of very low energy efficiency levels can send 
clear signals to the market. This approach is adopted in the UK, where a legislation 
adopted in 2011 will make it unlawful to lease properties of energy label F or below 
after 2018. Together with this, tenants will be allowed to demand energy efficiency 
upgrades on their properties from 2016 onwards and a tax break scheme will be put 
in place in order to provide financial support to residential landlords in the 
transitional period 2014-2017. 
 
 For countries or building sector segments where rent controls are applied, 
integrating the energy performance in the rent ceiling evaluation can help reduce 
disincentives. In Germany, a rent index, taking into account the energy performance 
of a building, is currently being tested in 7 communities.  
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 Energy performance certificates have failed to create a strong impact on the market. 
Quality problems, lack of enforcement and poor implementation in practice are 
some of the issues that need to be addressed. A distinction between building- and 
user-related energy consumption, where the responsibility of the first lies with the 
landlord and the second with the tenant, is increasingly needed. 
 
 Split incentives can be addressed through a packaged solution consisting of 
mandatory energy savings, revised rent act, green leases, improved energy labels 
and actions to further facilitate ESCO activities. 
 
 A shift towards the consideration of inclusive rent can support cost-recovery models 
based on a rent increase or fee on utility bill. This, however, should be considered 
together with feedback mechanisms in order to avoid reverse-split incentives. 
Individual metering, in cases where this is cost-effective and technically possible, 
can be of great added value. 
 
 Traditional forms of leases (gross or net) create asymmetries in the relationship 
between landlords and tenants and therefore do not set the ground for energy 
efficiency investments. In the commercial sector, green leases can bridge these 
differences by splitting costs and benefits between the parties in such a way that 
both parties can benefit from an energy retrofit. Despite their potential, green leases 
are not currently widely used in Europe. Sharing standard green lease guidelines can 
increase awareness among key interest groups. The public rental sector can also 
lead by example by adopting green leases for their rented premises.  
 
 A key challenge is how to accurately predict the energy savings resulting from the 
energy efficiency upgrade. In New York City, tenants that enter into a green lease can 
use a 20% "performance buffer", which allows them to pay only 80% of the 
predicted cost savings and thereby protects them against any risk of 
underperformance.  
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Introduction 
 
Improving energy efficiency is often seen as the most cost-effective means of achieving 
the EU greenhouse gas emission targets. In particular, the energy efficiency potential of 
the building sector has enjoyed increasing attention in recent years. Modernising the 
building sector, however, is associated with a number of barriers. Split incentives are 
common barriers between building owners and tenants that, in practice, hinder the 
uptake of energy efficiency investments. 
 
Article 19(1)(a) of the Energy Efficiency Directive (Directive 2012/27/EU) recognises 
the importance of addressing the barrier of split incentives in the building sector. It 
states: 
 
Member States shall evaluate and if necessary take appropriate measures to remove regulatory 
and non-regulatory barriers to energy efficiency, without prejudice to the basic principles of the 
property and tenancy law of the Member States, in particular as regards: 
(a) the split of incentives between the owner and the tenant of a building or among owners, 
with a view to ensuring that these parties are not deterred from making efficiency- improving 
investments that they would otherwise have made by the fact that they will not individually 
obtain the full benefits or by the absence of rules for dividing the costs and benefits between 
them, including national rules and measures regulating decision- making processes in multi- 
owner properties 
 
In this context, the European Commission's Joint Research Centre, on behalf of DG 
Energy, organised a workshop on split incentives with the aim to exchange information 
about the extent at which split incentives act as a barrier to energy efficiency 
investments in the building sector as well as investigate current solutions, their 
effectiveness and ways forward. The workshop focused on the social housing, private 
residential and commercial sectors. Practices from Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, 
Denmark, Sweden and the U.S. were presented and a panel discussion between 
representatives from groups of landlords, tenants, social housing and ESCOs was held. 
 
This report provides a summary of the main findings of the workshop and presentation 
summaries which are structured in the following sections: 
 Practices in the social housing sector 
 Aligning incentives of landlords and tenants in private residential units 
 Alternative approaches for incentivising tenants and owners in residential & 
commercial sectors 
All presentation material can be downloaded here. 
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Practices in the social housing sector 
Netherlands 
Speaker: Rene Van Genugten, Aedes 
 
The Dutch social housing sector represents a substantial share of the country’s rental 
market, consisting of at least 2.4 million dwellings. This is equivalent to 30% of all 
Dutch housing stock. SHAERE1, a database with energy-related information on the social 
housing stock updated on a yearly basis, showed that the average energy index of the 
Dutch social dwellings was 1.73, which is equivalent to label D according to the Dutch 
energy labelling system.  Most Dutch homes are heated by natural gas, while estimates 
show that social tenants pay €4 billion for heating and electricity costs every year. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Monitored energy performance of the social housing stock in the Netherlands based on SHAERE 
data 
Energy saving and sustainability are high on the agenda of Dutch social housing 
organisations. The updated National Covenant on Energy Saving in the rental sector 
aims at an average energy label B by the end of 2020. This represents an energy saving 
target of 33% between 2008 and 2021 and concerns building- and installation-related 
energy consumption for space heating, hot water and ventilation. The present rate and 
depth of energy renovations are, however, not sufficient to meet this target. Moreover, 
the total investment needed to reach this goal amounts to approximately € 8 billion. 
 
Prior to 2011, the rent ceiling was evaluated using a point system established in order 
to take into account various criteria such as the dwelling quality, location and size. This 
ceiling defined the maximum rent social landlords could charge. A bill, however, which 
was approved in March 2011, enabled the incorporation of the energy performance of 
the dwelling in the criteria list used in the evaluation.  This change now offers landlords 
                                                        
1
 SHAERE (Social Rented Sector Audit and Evaluation of Energy Conservation Results) is a database collecting 
and monitoring the total energy consumption, CO2 emissions and average energy index of social housing 
dwellings. 
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the opportunity to increase the rent if the energy label improves and thereby an 
opportunity to recuperate part of the investment costs for energy efficiency upgrades. 
  
 
 
In addition to the 2020 target, the National Covenant on Energy Saving in the Rental 
Sector also states that a "total housing costs guarantee" must be achieved, which simply 
means that tenants must be assured an overall reduction in their “total housing costs” 2 
as a result of the intervention.  That is, the reduced utility costs together with the 
revised rent should be lower than the sum of utility costs and rent before the 
intervention. The housing costs guarantee, which involves the use of a phased plan and 
a computation model, was set up by Aedes3 and the Dutch Tenants’ Association and is 
based on the calculated energy cost savings for building-related energy use, assuming a 
normalized (standardized) consumption.  
 
With the total housing cost guarantee, revised rent ceiling evaluation and 2020 social 
housing target, the ground is better prepared for more energy efficiency upgrades to 
become reality in the Dutch social housing sector. The lack of major legal obligations is 
also considered as a positive step. It should be noted that a key element for success is 
the availability and accessibility of financing. The Dutch social housing corporations 
have the possibility to obtain relatively easy upfront financing through guaranteed, long 
term commercial bank loans with low (below 3%) interest rates. By attaining long term 
loans, it is possible to maintain a low rise of the rent, which in turn ensures a reduction 
in the total housing costs after the intervention is carried out (i.e. meets the total 
housing cost guarantee mentioned above). The financing structure of the Dutch housing 
corporations is such that the social housing sector functions as a revolving fund. 
Although this approach has proven a success, it is currently under heavy pressure. 
 
                                                        
2
 Total housing costs refer to the sum of rent and utility costs 
3
 Aedes is the national association of social housing organisations in the Netherlands 
  An average energy index of 1.25 (label B) for social housing dwellings has been set as 
a target in the Netherlands. Current investments need to accelerate in order to meet 
the target. 
 The social rent ceiling evaluation has been revised in order to include the energy 
performance of the building in the criteria list. Social landlords can charge a lump 
sum, consisting of rent and utility costs (i.e. gross lease). 
 An Aedes database collecting energy-related data of social dwellings allows the 
monitoring of the energy performance of the social housing stock at a yearly basis on 
a national level. 
 The Dutch social housing sector acts as one large revolving fund, where social 
housing corporations invest in energy efficiency upgrades of rented dwellings and 
use repayments to reinvest in new upgrades. 
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Italy 
Speaker: Marco Corradi, Acer 
 
In the Italian region of Emilia Romagna, a law was approved in December 2013 that 
permits the use of energy cost savings for investment repayments of energy efficiency 
interventions.  This overcomes a major hurdle faced by many social housing companies 
across the EU which cannot pass any costs to tenants in case of energy renovations. If 
this is however allowed, energy cost savings can then be used to repay part of the 
investment through the provision of a "heat" service or rent increase. This mechanism 
can facilitate the work done by ESCOs in the social housing sector. 
 
 Figure 2 - Distribution of energy costs before (left) and after (right) an energy efficiency intervention 
 
The FRESH project (an IEE-funded project) demonstrated that energy performance 
contracting (EPC) can be used for energy efficiency upgrades in the social housing 
sector on a large scale. The project results confirmed the possibility of this cost recovery 
model (via a rent fee) through the involvement of ESCO companies. For example, energy 
efficiency interventions which can yield 50% savings were paid back by allocating 60% 
of the savings as a fee, while the remaining 40% savings remained to the tenants. In this 
way, tenants enjoyed 20% energy cost savings after the intervention throughout the 
duration of the contract (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 3 - Contractual relationship between main actors in an energy renovation for social housing through 
an EPC contract 
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Under this scenario, the contractual relationships (illustrated in Figure 3) are as follows. 
The ESCO company guarantees and certifies a minimum percentage of energy savings 
(e.g. 50%), while the tenants agree to renounce part of the savings to pay back the 
investment during the contract lifetime. A 12-year contract is signed between the social 
housing company and ESCO company, which can be renegotiated in case of future 
interventions. The ESCO company bills the social housing company at 2-month intervals 
and provides a monitoring report on individual consumptions. The social housing 
company recovers the costs from tenants and pays the bills issued by the ESCO 
company. 
 
While energy performance contracting has been proven a successful approach in the 
social housing sector, a number of obstacles need to be overcome. The main difficulties 
are associated with collecting historical costs for individual electricity consumption as 
well as comparing real (historical) and theoretical consumption levels. Other obstacles 
include the lack of access to credit facilities, lack of knowledge and information on ESCO 
companies and EPCs and fragmentation of incentives. A number of legal obstacles are 
also present. These are related to the lack of knowledge and dissemination of EPC 
contracts in the public administration, lack of specific legislation giving management 
authorities a sufficient decision-making power to manage the project operation with a 
high degree of autonomy, lack of a contract type in which the operator finances the 
necessary works to ensure energy efficiency through savings achieved by the 
intervention. In addition, public administration contracts are still not allowed to 
separate the supply of fuel and activity of energy efficiency (that is, work and 
management). 
 
United States 
Speaker: Stephen Bird, Clarkson University 
 
Low income tenants in the U.S. affect 1.89% of all energy use4 and are associated with 
potential energy savings equivalent to $4-11 billion per year. While the energy burden 
has increased for all income groups in the period 2001-2011 (Figure 4), low income 
households have experienced the sharpest increase with energy costs representing 
nearly 70% of the after-tax income of households earning less than $10k.  
 
Figure 4 - Energy costs as a percent of after-tax income in the U.S (Source: ACCCE, 2011) 
                                                        
4
 All energy use includes transport as well 
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Current policy responses for split incentives in the U.S. are generally attached to a 
number of drawbacks. Green leases – enabling an energy saving agreement between 
landlords and tenants – have gained increasing popularity in the past few years in the 
U.S. They are, however, more appropriate for large, commercial buildings rather than 
small units such as houses. Externally funded loans based on the PACE model can be 
effective at addressing split incentives as the loan is attached to the property and paid 
back by an additional charge on the property tax bill. While this type of loans has gained 
a lot of momentum since its inception, in 2008 the main U.S. mortgage Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae, handling around 77% of the U.S. mortgages, refused to finance any more 
PACE loans as a response to the financial crisis. This was attributed to the risk attached 
to the “first lien” status associated with PACE loans meaning that municipalities had a 
priority over the lender in case of default. Some efforts are now being taken to revive 
the programmes in certain areas; however they currently do not offer an immediately 
available solution.    
 
On-bill financing, which allocates the financing responsibility to the utility and 
maintains the loan attached to the property, is not considered an appropriate solution 
to overcome the split incentives between landlords and tenants5. This financing 
mechanism is, in fact, faced with some controversy among tenant groups in the U.S. 
especially in terms of its appropriateness as a solution for the social housing sector. This 
is due to the benefits accrued to the landlords as a result of upgrading the rented 
property (e.g. higher property value) with payments trickled down to tenants. In 
practice, however, the actual interest of landlords has not met expectations as it is 
believed that high transaction costs linked to the realisation of investments deter 
landlords from engaging in renovating their rented property. 
 
Regulatory measures such as building codes can be effective but apply only to new 
constructions in the U.S., while low-income rental mandates are often politically 
unpalatable and can create a severe disincentive for landlords to participate.  All-In 
services programmes such as the U.S. Weatherization Assistance programme are 
generally very expensive, and thus cannot offer a scalable solution. It is generally 
believed that solutions of voluntary nature are more appropriate for social housing, a 
sector which already has to comply with a variety of government regulations.  
 
Modifications applied to some of the above policy responses could address some of the 
concerns. If landlords are allowed to get an incentive in the form of a small share of 
savings, covering the transaction costs attached to the upgrade, this could trigger 
participation in on-bill programmes on behalf of social housing landlords (see examples 
in Table 1). Certain conditions however need to apply: inspections, transparent energy 
information and commitment by the landlord to maintain participation. Utilities should 
be protected from risk/default while decoupling legislation, allowing utilities to gain 
incentives for running effective efficiency programmes, is critical. A revolving fund, 
using sources such as system benefit charges or carbon charges, could be set up to 
provide guarantees, address default and risk concerns for financing these upgrades as 
                                                        
5
 It is believed that it is more suitable for the target group of owner occupiers 
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well as lower the interest rates if considered necessary. It should be stressed that these 
funds are not used to fully finance the investment. 
 
Table 1 - Examples of on-bill financing schemes with landlord incentives 
Loan amount 6000 3800 
Financing 3% @ 15 years  
(interest rate subsidised) 
0% @7 years 
(interest rate subsidised) 
Financing cost per month $43 $45 
Landlord incentive (month) $10 (first 5 years) $5 (first 4 years) 
Projected savings (month) $67 in electricity & heating $53 in electricity & heating 
Monthly savings for tenant $14 (first 5 years) 
$ 24 (years 6-15) 
$ 67 (years 16 and on…) 
$4 (first 5 years) 
$9 (years 6-7) 
$54 (years 8 and on…) 
Total Landlord Incentive 5x$120/yr payments 
Total: $600 
4x$60/yr payments 
Total: $240 
 
It should be stressed that in addition to the split incentive issues, attention should also 
be paid in the cases where reverse split incentives are found, i.e. in situations where 
residents have little or no incentive to conserve energy and/or do not practice energy 
saving behaviour due to the fact that they are not responsible for paying their utility 
bills. In the U.S. this is typically the case in university housing and public housing 
projects. A pilot programme with the objectives to provide energy 
information/education, real time feedback as well as motivation and goal setting has 
been kicked off in a university campus. Preliminary results have so far shown a 3-5 
degree Fahrenheit average temperature reduction as well as a 12-18% electricity and 
water reduction.  
 
 Regulatory measures are generally not considered appropriate for the social housing 
sector. Green leases mostly focus on commercial properties, while PACE loans do not 
offer an immediate solution. 
 On-bill finance programmes designed to provide incentives to all participating 
groups – landlords, tenants and utility companies – can offer an attractive solution 
for addressing split incentives. Under such programme, social landlords should be 
compensated for transaction cost in order to undertake energy efficiency 
investments in social housing units. 
 Attention should be paid in housing units where reverse split incentives occur. In 
these cases, different measures can be applied in order to provide real time feedback 
and motivate the user 
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Aligning incentives of landlords and tenants in private residential 
units 
United Kingdom 
Speaker: Andrew Warren, Association for the Conservation of Energy 
 
In Britain, privately rented units account for around 30% of all dwellings and 50% of all 
commercial properties6. Rent prices are entirely set by the market place as there are no 
forms of rent controls in the private rental sector. The average homeownership is 10 
years, while the average tenancy is around 18-19 months. A number of legislative and 
fiscal initiatives to overcome the landlord/tenant barrier on energy efficiency 
improvements exist with various levels of success.  
 
The Landlords Energy Saving Allowance, a tax break scheme which has been in 
existence for many years, gives the opportunity to landlords to deduct the cost of 
acquiring and installing certain energy saving measures against their income tax. The 
scheme has, however, had a limited impact with only 0.03% of landlords benefitting 
from it thus far. The flagship policy in the UK instead is the so-called Green Deal which 
aims to use the on-bill finance concept to deliver major energy savings in the UK’s 
building sector, inter-alia addressing split incentives barrier. The UK has been the first 
European country which adopted an on-bill finance scheme, designed to address, inter-
alia, the split incentive barrier. The Green Deal, which came into force in the beginning 
of 2013, allows owners to install measures at no upfront costs and enables repayments 
to be made through a charge on the occupants’ utility bills.  The repayment stays with 
the utility bill rather than the occupier and gets transferred to whoever is the electricity 
supplier. The scheme has so far failed to attract sufficient participation as it is attached 
to a number of weaknesses, the main one being the high interest rate attached to the 
Green deal loans. The interest rate attached to the loan is at least interest rate of 7% 
plus add-ons, which is considered uncompetitive.  Despite the attractive Green deal 
element of attaching the loan to the property, traditional commercial bank loans or re-
financing existing mortgages offer cheaper forms of financing.  
 
                                                        
6
 Northern Ireland is not included here as it generally follows very different policies with the rest of the UK 
area 
 20 
 
 
A recent legislation, adopted in 2011, stipulates that no landlord can let out a property 
with an energy performance label F or below by 20187. While sale transactions of 
buildings with label F or below can still be undertaken after 2018, these properties can 
only be occupied by their new owners. With a 7 year period between its adoption and 
enforcement, it is hoped that the legislation will provide a sufficient window 
opportunity for landlords to take measures before the law is in effect. This has already 
had some impact in the non-residential sector, which can be justified by two main 
reasons: (1) leases in the non-residential sector tend to be of longer duration and 
therefore early action is expected and (2) property agents have been supportive as they 
viewed it as a market opportunity for themselves. This is, however, not the case with 
the residential sector where no actions have been observed thus far. A push during this 
transitional period is anticipated by the enforcement of a new legislation allowing 
tenants to demand energy performance improvements in the rented property from 
2016 onwards. This should be also complemented by a new tax break (with a dedicated 
annual budget of £35 million) designed to target residential landlords in the period July 
2014 to March 2017.  The remaining question is whether the scheme should be 
designed to encourage early movers (that is, before the deadline of 2018) or incentivise 
larger improvements than the minimum energy label E. 
 
Denmark  
Speaker: Per Anker Jensen, Technical University of Denmark 
 
Buildings in Denmark are responsible for around 40% of the total energy use. District 
heating is the main energy carrier followed by electricity. While there are many 
financially profitable energy efficiency measures, these are not implemented in reality 
and principal-agent split incentives comprise a major market failure.  
 
To tackle misalignments between landlords and tenants, packaged policy solutions are 
necessary. In the Danish context, a number of measures exist, however improvements 
are imperative if a real change is to be achieved. Mandatory energy savings to be 
realised by energy supply companies as part of the energy efficiency obligation scheme 
is a key legislation in Denmark. Through these obligations, energy supply companies 
                                                        
7
 It has been estimated that around 18-20% of the properties are currently labelled as F or below 
 Every successful energy saving programme needs three main components: carrots to 
provide incentives, sticks to ensure compliance and tambourines to increase 
awareness. 
 The landlords energy saving allowance, a tax break scheme aimed to improve the 
energy performance of rented properties, has not been successful. The Green Deal, 
which is the first on-bill finance scheme in Europe, has so far failed to attract 
sufficient interest by owners and occupants. 
 There are a number of new instruments that are designed to overcome the 
landlord/tenant barrier: a law under which all properties of energy label F or below 
cannot be let out after 2018, a law allowing tenants to demand energy efficiency 
upgrades on their properties from 2016 onwards and a tax break scheme supporting 
residential landlords in the transitional period 2014-2017. 
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provide consultation services as well as direct subsidies for energy renovations in the 
premises of their customers. While this is in general a successful scheme, it does not 
currently focus on customers in the residential sector. Increasing the interest of 
supplier companies in residential energy savings as well as prioritising rented housing 
units could help the scheme deliver more energy savings in this particular segment of 
the residential sector. 
 
 
 
In addition, the examination and revision of the rent act is key to a successful package 
tackling split incentives. In Denmark, no incentives are given to landlords for 
implementing energy efficiency measures. Under Danish law, one tenant can obstruct 
renovation work in a condominium even if there is consensus among all remaining 
tenants. Increasing landlords incentives together with clearer guidelines and fairer 
tenant democratic rules are important. Agreements need to be made on issues such as 
the extent at which the rent can be increased and conditions in which the tenants can 
reject rent rises. 
 
Green leases, a voluntary agreement between tenants and landlords, offers another 
possible solution, if combined with the necessary legislative changes. As experience 
with green leases is currently limited, municipalities and public institutions can lead by 
example by entering into green leases for their rented premises. A standard green lease 
based on energy label improvements, which should be made publically available, can 
increase awareness and guide other landlords and tenants on how they can enter into a 
green lease. So far, green leases have been popular in Australia. Green leasing can be  
part of wider scheme aiming to improve the sustainability of rented space. For example, 
the landlord's Responsible Property Investment (RPI) strategy, a strategy introduced by 
UNEP in 2005 aims to  encourage property investors to consider economic, 
environmental and social sustainability in their decision making process regarding 
acquisition, management and sale of buildings.  
 
 Split incentives can be addressed through a packaged solution consisting of 
mandatory energy savings, revised rent act, green leases, improved energy labels and 
actions to further facilitate ESCO activities. 
 Although Denmark was one of the first countries to enact an energy performance 
certification scheme in the early 1990s, its impact so far has not been as expected. 
 22 
 
 
Figure 5 - Energy consumption of a renovated building following an in-house and ESCO approach
 23 
 
 
Energy labelling is another important instrument which so far has 
not had the effect that was originally expected in Denmark. This 
can be attributed to the lack of repercussions for not labelling and 
its long 10 year validation period. Improved label quality, 
shortening the interval between audits as well as the introduction 
of repercussions can make their effect more widespread. Changes 
in energy performance contracts are also necessary. ESCOs have 
been in operation in Denmark only in recent years where their 
main activity is focused on municipality buildings. The guaranteed 
savings model8 is mostly used due to the fact that municipalities 
can have easy access to low-cost financing. It can be generally 
observed that energy performance contracts are of economic sense 
for buildings of minimum size of 7500 m2 or 2 million DKK of 
annual energy costs due to the large transaction costs experienced 
in these projects. The need to reduce transaction costs is therefore 
critical for the success of this model in smaller buildings.  
 
Sweden 
Speaker: Lovisa Högberg, Royal Institute of Technology 
 
Single family and co-operative housing units account for around 
40% of all Swedish property area, while the private and public 
rental sectors make up for around 20%. A traditional social 
housing sector does not exist in Sweden as municipality housing 
firms, which own as much property area as private owners, need to 
operate in a business-like environment and thus act in very similar 
terms with private owners. Municipality housing firms however 
need to hold certain social responsibilities. In comparison to 
municipality owners, private owners are usually small in number 
and therefore scattered. Commercial properties account for around 
20% of the floor area and they operate under normal free market 
settings. 
 
The dominating residential lease type in Sweden is the "so-called" 
inclusive rent9, where landlords charge a lump sum consisting of 
the base rent plus heating and/or hot water costs. The tenant pays 
the inclusive rent directly to the landlord, while the landlord is 
responsible for the contract with the utility company. Utility bills in 
multi-apartment building are split based on the share of the floor 
area each housing unit occupies10. It should be noted that a large 
share of the multi-apartment buildings is served by district heating. 
Commercial leases in Sweden, 64% of which are based on the 
                                                        
8
 In the guaranteed savings model, the ESCO guarantees the savings, while the building owner finances the 
investments 
9
 Other commonly used terms are warm rent 
10
 The main drawback of this method is that it doesn’t distinguish between corner apartment and apartments 
which are enclosed by other heated spaces 
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concept of inclusive rent (Figure 6), are generally shorter (4-5 
years) compared to other European countries.   Electricity and 
cooling is usually metered and charged separately. 
Setting the inclusive rent is typically a result of negotiations 
between landlord and tenant representatives, where past years' 
consumption levels are used to determine the utility-based costs. 
While an incentive is given to the landlord to improve the building 
in order to reach lower energy consumption, tenants have no direct 
incentives to save energy. In practice, landlords can set limits in the 
consumption; that is, they can regulate the maximum indoor 
temperature during the winter months (e.g. 20oC degrees) and 
thereby partly control the occupant behaviour. The main drawback 
of the Swedish model is that unless landlords put in place these 
temperature controls, tenants are not incentivised to reduce their 
energy consumption. Conversely, tenants are not reimbursed if 
their consumption is lower than the assumed /agreed 
consumption. Further incentive misalignments may arise if a third 
party (e.g. property manager) is involved in the negotiations.  
 
 
Figure 6 - Lease structure of the commercial sector in Sweden 
On the other hand, it is believed that one of the advantages of the 
inclusive rent model used in the Swedish context is that it provides 
incentives for landlords to care for their buildings in the long run. 
This is because landlords are the actors who are most likely 
interested in improving the quality of their property. In addition, 
the Swedish model is attached to no transaction costs which would 
arise if metering and charging were to be undertaken. If individual 
metering was to be considered, poor building characteristics will 
not be reflected in the rent, while it would create volatile incentives 
in case of energy price changes. 
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Together with controlled indoor temperature, it is suggested that 
green leases may complement the existing practices in Sweden. A 
green lean would require both parties (tenants, landlords) to 
create an action plan with common goals of reducing the energy 
consumption, while share the costs and benefits. 
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Alternative approaches for incentivising tenants and 
owners in residential & commercial sectors 
German Housing Rent Index  
Speaker: Martin Vaché, Institute of Housing and Environment 
 
The German housing market is predominantly a rental-based 
market where 55% of dwellings are rented. Many of these rented 
dwellings are in the privately rental market with an estimated 57% 
held by private individual landlords. The average tenant occupancy 
in Germany is considered long at around 8-15 years.  
 
A rent index, a city wide listing of average rental prices, can be used 
as a form of rent control with the aim to protect tenants against 
large rent increases as well as eviction. It simply prohibits 
landlords from raising the rent beyond the, so-called, "average 
local rent" introduced by the rent index. While the system is 
voluntary in nature, it becomes legally binding once a city decides 
to adopt it. In such a case, the concerned city is required to publish 
officially recognised rental indices which are derived by empirical 
market rent surveys. The computation of 4-year averages of 
market rent prices at the local level is necessary to determine these 
indexes, which are differentiated according to a number of 
features: dwelling type, size, quality, location and facilities. Rather 
than creating incentives, this concept is designed to reduce 
disincentives by allowing landlords to reflect energy efficiency 
improvements in the rent. The whole system is therefore based on 
the willingness to pay. 
 
While the dwelling age was used as the main indicator to 
determine the dwelling quality in the past, other factors (e.g. 
energy efficiency) must now be taken into consideration. A system, 
which considers additional factors resulting in a more accurate 
estimation of the dwelling quality, is therefore necessary. In 2001, 
the German Institute of Housing and Environment (IWU) was the 
first institute to attempt incorporating energy efficiency standards 
in the rent index as well as measuring the willingness to pay for 
improved energy efficiency. Following an approximate 10 year 
period of trial and error, the Federal Institute for Building Research 
(BBSR) started a field study in 6 communities11 in 2012 with the 
aim to improve methodological knowledge around this topic and 
establish quality standards. In 2013, an amendment of the federal 
rent index statutes made the evaluation of energy efficiency 
standards mandatory in rent indexes, giving a momentum towards 
the establishment of such a system in the market. Earlier this year 
(2014), an IWU survey showed that 25% of the German rental 
                                                        
11
 The number of involved communities has now been raised to 7. 
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housing stock is under regulation of a legally qualified rent index 
incorporating basic energy efficiency aspects.  Most large cities, 
however, use a system based on a very poor level of sophistication. 
 
In addition to the disincentive reduction explained above, the 
incorporation of energy efficiency standards in rent indexes can 
create transparency and raise awareness within the housing 
industry. It can be used as a tool to foster investments by offering a 
simple and transparent compensation scheme, giving the 
opportunity to landlords to choose a more rewarding cost-based 
compensation scheme. Above all, the benefit of such system lies 
with its ability to overcome the temporal split incentives issues, as 
renters accept higher rents in order to compensate landlords for 
the investments. The system does not require a contract between a 
tenant and a landlord, and the landlord can still recover the costs 
from the next tenant if the current tenant moves out. 
The federal government’s field study aimed to work together with 
7 communities using rent indexes in order to address a number of 
questions. The first question was how energy efficiency standards 
can be defined and measured. While this may be considered trivial 
due to the existence of energy labels, it should be noted that the 
German energy performance certificates are considered to be 
complex and therefore difficult to understand. Due to their non-
mandatory status, they are hardly used where estimates show that 
only 10% of all tenants know about the energy label of their house. 
The research investigates if the physical aspects of the construction 
can form an alternative definition where the main qualities of 
walls, windows and other aspects of the construction are taken into 
account to determine the energy efficiency standard. Secondly, the 
research posed the question of how empirical evidence on the 
effect of the rent on the improved energy efficiency can be 
obtained. This is particularly difficult to answer due to the large 
heterogeneity in the housing market with small sample sizes of 
500-3500 as well as poor market transparency. Thirdly, the 
research aimed to address ways of overcoming political 
obstructions in order to overcome differences between renter and 
private landlord lobbies. 
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Figure 7 - Physical structure assessment as a proxy for theoretical energy demand 
The results so far has highlighted a number of issues. Firstly the 
measurement of energy efficiency is particularly complex and 
without mandatory and simplified EPCs, it is difficult to implement 
energy performance based premiums in rent indices. In addition, 
the empirical findings do not necessarily prove that there are 
efficiency related rent mark-ups in all cities. However, it was 
observed that the average empirical rent mark-up ranged between 
3-8%, depending on the efficiency standard. While this is positive, 
these levels of mark-ups are not sufficient to fully recover 
investment costs12. In addition, the willingness to pay usually 
ignores non-monetary aspects such as comfort, which is of 
important value for tenants. From a political perspective, an 
increased share of efficient housing can help reduce lobby 
opposition while from a distributional point of view, rent 
premiums are considered better than cost-based compensation. It 
can be conclude that this approach can indeed help reduce split 
incentives; however they cannot fully cover individual investments 
risks, such as high transaction costs and low economies of scale. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
12
 With a 4-7% increase, investment costs can be recovered within a 20-year period. 
 The current German energy performance certificates are considered to be complex 
and therefore difficult to understand  
 Energy performance based premiums can help reduce disincentives for landlords; 
however they cannot fully overcome the split incentives between landlords and 
tenants. 
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U.S. Green Leases 
Speaker: Adam Sledd, Institute for Market Transformation 
 
Current practices and programmes are not always perceived as an 
effective solution to overcome split incentive issues which is the 
main reason why there is a fresh focus on leasing issues in the U.S 
in the last years.  
 
Traditional commercial leases in U.S. are considered a "zero-sum" 
game in that one party's gains are considered as loses by the other. 
These are a result of complex, often long negotiation processes 
between tenants and owners, where each side seeks to promote its 
own interests. This is primarily caused by incentive misalignments 
between tenants and landlords which effectively prohibit them 
from joining forces to save energy in the concerned property. 
Further complications typically arise by the fact that owner or 
tenant company staff that are responsible for sustainability or 
energy efficiency issues, are not involved in the leasing process. 
High transaction costs that accrue from delays due to prolonged 
negotiations are another hurdle. 
 
There is currently a large U.S. interest in green leases for the 
private sector. Green leases aim to split costs and benefits between 
the parties in such a way that both parties can benefit from an 
energy retrofit. Distributing costs and benefits with respect to 
utilities in a lease are essentially associated with the question of 
who assumes the costs and risks. In the case of electric rent 
inclusion13, landlords are responsible for both operation and 
capital expenses. The risks are therefore held by the landlord as 
tenants have no incentives in saving energy.  Conversely, if tenants 
are directly responsible for their utility bills in a triple-net rent14, 
operating costs and thereby risks are passed through to tenants 
and landlords have no incentive in carrying out energy efficiency 
upgrades in the property. Commercial leases based on electric rent 
inclusion were practiced in the U.S. up until 40 years ago, when a 
total shift towards direct electricity leases followed. However, 
neither concept offers an effective solution to split incentives. 
Green leases can form a bridge between the 2 concepts by offering 
a tool that addresses the asymmetries in the relationships between 
building owners and tenants. 
 
                                                        
13
 In an electric rent inclusion, the landlord charges electricity directly to the tenant on a monthly basis at a 
fixed amount. 
14
 A lease agreement that designates the lessee (the tenant) as being solely responsible for all of the costs 
relating to the asset being leased in addition to the rent fee applied under the lease 
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Under a green lease, costs associated with investments undertaken 
by the landlord can be compensated  by a small amount of energy 
savings that  can  be passed through to the landlords. The cost 
recovery is typically done by amortisation, which can be based on 
the actual or predicted energy savings. There are many different 
versions of green lease clauses due to varying lease language. In 
New York City, recovering the cost based on predicted energy 
savings is considered risky by tenants in case energy upgrades 
underperform. For this reason, the owners' capital expense that 
can pass through can be up to 80% of predicted savings in a given 
year. This is based on industry's experience which showed that 
actual savings are generally within ± 20% of predicted savings. 
Tenants are therefore protected from underperformance by a 20% 
"performance buffer".  
 
In addition to split incentive solutions, leases are affected by other 
sustainability trends such as the LEED, GRESB and Energy star 
programmes including the revolution in creating smart metering 
technology which have all made property owners more aware of 
energy use in tenant spaces.  
 
As leases are private transactions, it is almost impossible to find 
reliable information on common practices. The green lease library 
(greenleaselibrary.com) is an online platform which aims to 
collate all available green lease resources, including European, 
Australian and Canadian practices.  
 
Green Lease implications in 11 European Countries 
Speaker: Aart C. Hordijk, European Property Federation 
A survey was initiated in the beginning of 2013, with the goal of 
developing an inventory of the hurdles related to split incentives in 
practice, highlight differences between European countries and 
provide suggestions on how to increase the understanding around 
the issue of split incentives. While green leases deal with all aspects 
of sustainability in buildings, the focus of this survey was primarily 
on energy efficiency. The questionnaire was answered by 
practitioners and European Property Federation country 
representatives.  
 
 Traditional forms of leases (gross or net) create asymmetries in the relationship 
between landlords and tenants. 
 Green leases can bridge the differences between landlords and tenants created by 
these traditional forms of leases. 
 Information on common green lease practices is not widely available due to private 
nature of these transactions. Different versions of green lease clauses exist. 
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Some interesting results can be highlighted through the responses 
of the on-going survey. For example, passing the costs of energy 
savings to the tenant in the leasing contract is possible in Sweden, 
Norway, Romania, Bulgaria, the Netherlands and the UK. This is 
also possible in Spain but in reality hard to realise. In Finland and 
the UK, costs can also be passed indirectly through the service 
charges, while passing the costs of energy savings to the tenant in 
Portugal is forbidden by law. Standard green lease clauses are 
included in the leases in the cases of Sweden, Norway, Finland, UK 
and Netherlands, while negotiations prior to drafting these clauses 
are needed in Romania, Bulgaria and Spain. It is forbidden to 
include any green lease clauses in Portuguese contracts.  
 
In terms of energy prices, large variations are observed ranging 
from €0.10 to 0.25 per kWh electricity. The share of energy costs in 
terms of the total operating costs is considered low in Spain, 
Sweden, Norway and the UK, medium in Finland and high in 
Bulgaria and the Netherlands; in the latter case, energy costs 
account for 50% of services charges and 10% of the rent paid. 
Discounts in energy prices for the industry sector are common in 
many countries.  
 
Energy savings investments are not typically funded by capital 
expenditures in Norway, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Bulgaria and the 
Netherlands; they are instead postponed to major maintenance or 
renovation. In Romania, government action and subsidies exist for 
house renovations, while in Sweden there is currently a proposal to 
create tax relief but no final agreement has been made by the tax 
authorities. Capital allowances permit the investment of certain 
energy efficiency measure to be offset against corporation tax. 
While energy labelling is mandatory for all new buildings, energy 
labels are neither systematic nor obligatory for existing buildings 
as they are only required at sale or lease transactions. Definitions 
of energy labels are under national review in Sweden and the 
Netherlands, while strong improvements in the case of Portugal 
and Bulgaria and a more rigours enforcement in the UK are 
necessary. Improvements to streamline energy savings process are 
perceived to be helpful in Spain.  
 
In summary, it can be stressed that there has been a slow progress 
so far in terms of tackling split incentives in the building sector in 
the examined countries. One of the main hurdles is how to get 
tenants contribute to the owner's investments through the realised 
energy savings. Low energy prices reduce the cost effectiveness of 
energy efficiency investments, while the need to improve energy 
labelling is stressed by many responses. Further work should be 
done in order to explore how the user- and building-related energy 
consumption can be separated. Experience so far has shown that 
this can be done by individual metering and debiting of energy 
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consumption by the user where the remainder is considered as 
energy consumption by the building. If individual metering does 
not exist, the indicative building energy consumption by the 
building (energy label) and the residual energy use will be used to 
determine the user energy consumption. 
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